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THE PERSISTENCE  OF  INFLATION 
Thomas  M.  Humphrey 
Among  the  most  exasperating  and  puzzling  of  re- 
cent  economic  phenomena  is  the  apparent  intracta- 
bility  of  the  inflation  rate.  Once  started,  an  inflation 
becomes  difficult  to  subdue.  It  seems  to  develop  a 
momentum  of  its  own,  independent  of  other  basic 
economic  conditions.  It  resists  or  at  best  responds 
only  sluggishly  to  traditional  restrictive  policies.  Its 
persistence  in  the  face  of  high  unemployment  and 
excess  capacity  has  resulted  in  the  addition  of  the 
term  stagflation  to  the  economist’s  lexicon. 
What  accounts  for  the  stickiness  of  the  inflation 
rate?  Why  is  it  so  policy-resistant  and  difficult  to 
control?  Why  is  it  so  slow  to  decelerate  even  when 
demand  is  slack?  Many  economists  believe  that  the 
answers  lie  in  the  mechanism  through  which  infla- 
tionary  impulses  are  transmitted  through  the  econ- 
omy.’  Embedded  in  this  mechanism  are  certain 
delays  or  lags  that  may  slow  the  spread  of  inflation 
over  the  total  price  structure  and  may  also  prolong 
its  duration.  Particular  prices  that  lag  behind  gen- 
eral  inflationary  movements  have  to  catch  up  later  to 
reestablish  their  relative  position  in  the  price  struc- 
ture.  This  lag/catch-up  characteristic  of  the  infla- 
tionary  transmission  mechanism  is  offered  by  some 
as  an  explanation  of  why  strong  upward  pressures 
on  prices  persist  long  after  demand  slackens. 
The  most  important  lags  in  the  process  by 
which  inflation  is  diffused  through  the  economy  are 
the  price-adjustment  lag  and  the  expectations-forma- 
tion  Zag.  The  first  refers  to  the  delayed  response  of 
the  rate  of  price  increase  to  shifts  in  aggregate  de- 
mand.  Demand  pressure  is  transmitted  to  prices 
via  a  complicated  and  circuitous  channel  that  runs 
from  output  to  inputs  to  input  prices  to  costs  and 
finally  to  product  prices.  The  price-adjustment  lag 
accounts  for  the  time  it  takes  for  demand  to  affect 
prices  through  the  channel  of  costs.  It  should  be 
noted  that  many  of  these  costs  themselves  adjust 
slowly,  partly  because  they  are  influenced  by  sticky 
price  anticipations.  These  sticky  anticipations  are 
described  by  the  second  lag,  which  refers  to  the 
slowness  with  which  expectations  of  future  inflation 
are  revised  when  individuals  realize  that  actual  in- 
flation  has  turned  out  to  be  different  than  was  ex- 
1 See,  for  example,  the  studies  by  Cagan  [l,  2,  3],  and 
Laidler  [5,  6].  See  also  the  articles  by  Friedman  [4] 
and  Selden  [8].  The  present  article  draws  heavily  from 
Cagan  and  Laidler. 
pected.  For  example,  immediately  following  periods 
of  rapidly  accelerating  inflation,  expectations  about 
the  future  behavior  of  prices  continue  to  reflect  the 
preceding  price  experience  even  though  the  current 
rate  of  inflation  may  be  decelerating.  Some  analysts 
point  to  these  lags  as  the  reason  that  inflation  is  so 
persistent  and  hard  to  subdue,  even  in the  face  of high 
unemployment  and  excess  capacity. 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is to  examine  the  price- 
adjustment  and  expectations-formation  lags  and  to 
indicate  how  they  may  affect  the  speed,  pattern,  and 
duration  of  inflation.  The  article  proceeds  in  the 
following  manner.  First,  it  identifies  the  location 
and  describes  the  operation  of  the  lags  in  the  infla- 
tionary  transmission  mechanism.  Second,  it  provides 
an  explanation  of  the  existence  of  the  lags.  Third, 
and  most  important,  it  analyzes  the  policy  implica- 
tions  of  the  lags.  Finally,  the  appendix  contains  a 
brief  description  of how  the  lags  are  treated  in  simple 
analytical  models  of  the  inflationary  process. 
Sketch  of  the  Inflationary  Process  The  first 
objective  is  to  describe  the  operation  of  the  lags  in 
the  inflationary  mechanism.  As  a  necessary  prelimi- 
nary,  a  brief  description  of  the  inflation  process  is 
offered,  with  emphasis  on the  time  sequence  or  chron- 
ological  order  in  which  key  economic  variables 
(spending,  output,  costs,  prices,  expectations,  etc.) 
adjust  to  inflationary  pressures.  The  hypothetical 
example  presented  below  may  not  conform  to  all  of 
the  inflationary  episodes  experienced  in  the  U.  S. 
although  it  probably  typifies  most  of  them. 
As  a  first  approximation,  the  sequence  of  events 
in  a  typical  inflation  may  be  described  as  beginning 
with  an  increase  in  aggregate  demand  to  a  level  in 
excess  of  the  economy’s  capacity  to  produce.2  Such 
2 In  starting  with  demand,  the  example  does  not  deny 
that  supply  shocks-crop  failures,  strikes,  natural  disas- 
ters  and  the  like-may  also  play  a  role  in  inflation. 
Given  the  random,  transient,  and  often  reversible  nature 
of  these  shocks,  however,  it  is  unlikely  that  they  could 
produce  a  continuing  (sustained)  inflation.  What  they 
can  do  is  to  temporarily  intensify  an  inflation  generated 
by  demand  forces.  This  is  the  problem  of  price  blips 
illustrated  by  the  transient  double-digit  episode  of  1974 
when  supply  constraints  caused  inflation  to  deviate  tem- 
porarily  from  its  basic  trend  rate  determined  by  excess 
demand.  When  the  supply  shocks  abated,  inflation  re- 
turned  to  its  basic  path.  Note  also  that  supply  shocks 
can  be  treated  as  an  excess  demand  phenomenon,  albeit 
one  in  which  the  excess  arises  from  falling  supply  rather 
than  rising  demand. 
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any  of  a  variety  of  causes  including  :  (1)  an  increase 
in  the  government’s  budgetary  deficits  ;  (2)  an  epi- 
sodic  expansion  in  private  spending  associated,  say, 
with  a  major  innovation  ; and  (3)  an  acceleration  in 
the  rate  of  monetary  growth  either  actively  engi- 
neered  or  passively  permitted  by  the  monetary  au- 
thorities.  Whatever  the  cause,  the  increased  rate  of 
spending,  if  it  is  to  continue,  must  be  supported  by  a 
sustained  higher  rate  of  monetary  growth.  Without 
this  concomitant  monetary  growth,  rising  prices 
would  simply  reduce  the  real  value  of  existing  cash 
balances  below  the  level  that  people  desire  to  hold. 
In  an  effort  to  rebuild  their  price-eroded  real  bal- 
ances,  cashholders  would  cut  expenditures,  thereby 
bringing  the  inflation  to  a  halt.  An  increased  rate  of 
spending  cannot  be  maintained  for  long  without  the 
monetary  expansion  necessary  to  finance  it.  Assum- 
ing  such  expansion  occurs,  however,  the  correspond- 
ing  increased  rate  of  spending  leads  to  a  buildup  of 
excess  demands  on  the  economy.  Businessmen  initi- 
ally  respond  to  this  rising  demand  not  by  raising 
prices  but  rather  by  reducing  inventories  and  expand- 
ing  output.  That  is,  their  initial  adjustments  are  to 
quantities;  price  adjustments  come  later-hence  the 
so-called  price-adjustment  lag. 
The  stimulus  to  final  output  resulting  from  these 
quantity  adjustments  is  transmitted  back  to  earlier 
stages  of  production  via  increases  in  the  demand  for 
labor  and  material  inputs,  as  well  as  for  intermediate 
(semi-finished)  products.  Demand  pressure  passes 
downward  to  lower  stages  of  production  where  prices 
-especially  those  of  raw  materials  and  other  basic 
commodities-are  particularly  sensitive  to  increases 
in  demand.  These  prices  begin  to  rise  almost  im- 
mediately  as  do  certain  competitive  (non-union) 
wages  whose  adjustment  is not  delayed  by  long-term 
union  contracts  or  collective  bargaining  agreements. 
Since  the  output  of  earlier  stages  of  the  productive 
process  constitutes  the  input  of  later  stages,  these 
rising  wages  and  prices  pass  back  up  through  the 
interindustry  structure  in the  form  of  increased  costs. 
In  short,  demand  pressure  is  transmitted  downward 
thus  invoking  cost  increases  that  ripple  upward  until 
they  finally  reach  the  finished  product  stage.  Here 
businessmen,  operating  with  fixed  percentage  mark- 
ups  over  costs,  pass  these  cost  increases  on  in  the 
form  of  higher  prices.  These  price  increases  induce 
workers  operating  under  collective  bargaining  agree- 
ments  to  bargain  for  cost  of  living  increases  in  the 
next  wage  contract.  The  resulting  increases  in  labor 
costs  are  passed  through  into  still  higher  prices. 
Such  cost-induced  price  increases,  of  course,  consti- 
tute  the  delayed  price  response  to  the  prior  shift  in 
demand.  These  cost  and  price  increases  provoke  fur- 
ther  rounds  of  wage  and  price  increases  that  add 
impetus  to  the  inflation  through  the  channel  of costs. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  expectations  lag  is  in 
operation  throughout  the  early  and  intermediate 
stages  of  the  inflation.  Price  anticipations  are  based 
on  perceived  trends  and  so  do  not  change  quickly. 
Because  these  trends  are  estimated  largely  from  past 
experience,  it  takes  time to  adjust  expectations  to 
higher  current  rates  of  inflation.  Thus  when  the 
actual  rate  of  inflation  begins  to  rise,  the  expected 
rate  is not  immediately  affected.  Only  after  the  actual 
rate  has  exceeded  the  expected  rate  for  a  time  will 
the  latter  start  to  rise.  But  it  will  rise  slowly  at  first 
because  it continues  to  reflect  the  lower  past  rates  of 
inflation.  Eventually,  however,  the  expected  rate  rises 
faster  and  faster  as  people  become  acclimated  to  the 
higher  actual  rate  and  adapt  their  expectations  to  it. 
Once  aroused,  inflationary  expectations  feed  back 
into  the  current  rate  of  inflation  as  firms  and  unions 
seek  to  raise  prices  and  wages  at  the  same  rate  as 
they  expect  prices  in  general  to  rise.  At  this  stage 
of  the  inflationary  process,  where  cost  increases  are 
passing  through  into  price  increases  and  the  expected 
rate  of  inflation  is  rising  to  catch  up  with  the  actual 
rate,  the  main  impact  of  the  inflationary  stimulus 
shifts  from  quantities  to  prices.  The  temporary  out- 
put  and  employment  effects  diminish,  and  purely in- 
flationary  price  effects  dominate.3  The  lags,  however, 
may  be  long;  and  the  price  system  may  take  several 
years-years  that  may  even  encompass  a  business 
recession-to  complete  all  adjustments.  Particular 
3 Note  that  the  expectations  lag  temporarily  influences 
real  economic  activity  by  causing  the  nominal  and  real 
(i.e.,  inflation-corrected)  prices  of  factor  inputs  to  move 
in  opposite  directions.  Put  differently,  the  expected 
inflation  component  of  nominal  wage  and  interest  rates 
may  not  adjust  sufficiently  to  offset  actual  inflation  thus 
causing  changes  in  the  corresponding  real  (price  de- 
flated)  values  of  those  variables.  For  example,  when  an 
inflationary  stimulus  begins,  nominal  wage  and  interest 
rates  adjust  upward  by  the  amount  of  the  expected  in- 
flation.  Because  the  expected  rate  of  inflation  lags  behind 
the  actual  rate,  however,  the  adjustment  is  incomplete 
and  consequently  real  wage  and  interest  rates  fall. 
Businessmen  take  advantage  of  the  falling  real  wage  and 
interest  rates  by  hiring  more  labor  and  borrowing  from 
banks  in  order  to  expand  production.  These  effects,  to- 
gether  with  decreases  in  the  demand  for  money  (and 
hence  rises  in  spending)  induced  by  higher  nominal 
interest  rates,  result  in  a  temporary  rise  in  real  output 
and  employment.  The  stimulus  ends,  however,  when 
expected  inflation  catches  up  with  actual  inflation.  When 
this  happens,  nominal  wage  and  interest  rates  fully  re- 
flect  the  actual  rate  of  inflation  and  real  wage  and 
interest  rates  return  to  their  initial  levels.  Similar  real 
effects  operate  on  the  downside  when  actual  inflation 
falls  below  expected  inflation.  In  this  case  the  expecta- 
tions  lag  results  in  a  temporary  rise  in  real  wage  and 
interest  rates  and  these  rising  real  costs  act  to  tempo- 
rarily  depress  real  economic  activity  below  its  equilibrium 
level. 
4  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1979 costs  and  prices  that  have  lagged  behind  the  others 
will  have  to  catch  up  in  order  to  restore  the  equilib- 
rium  price  relationships  disturbed  by  the  inflation. 
Also,  at  the  end  of  a  serious  inflation,  inflationary 
psychology  may  continue  to  exert  upward  pressure 
on  wages  and  prices  even  after  other  basic  pressures 
have  begun  to  diminish.  Wages  and  prices  continue 
to  mount  as  inflationary  expectations  adjust  to  catch 
up  with  the  accelerating  price  movements  of  the 
recent  past.  This  catch-up  process  may  extend  well 
into  an  ensuing  recession,  thus  resulting  in  the 
anomaly  of  rising  prices  despite  slackening  demand. 
In  the  process  just  described,  the  chain  of  caus- 
ation  or  pattern  of  adjustment  runs  from  spending  to 
output  to  costs  to  prices  to  expectations  and  back 
again  to  input  and  product  prices.  This  sequential 
process  is  represented  schematically  in  the  chart, 
which  also  shows  the  location  of  the  price-adjustment 
and  expectations  lags.  It  should  be emphasized,  how- 
ever,  that  an  important  constraint  exists  to  the  con- 
tinuous  operation  of  this  process.  Specifically,  the 
process  cannot  continue  unless  it  is  constantly  re- 
fueled  with  additional  supplies  of  money.  A  deter- 
mined  stand  by  the  monetary  authorities  to  deny  this 
fuel  will  eventually  bring  inflation  to  a  halt. 
The  Winding-Down  Process  The  lags  described 
in  the  preceding  section  continue  to  operate  even 
after  an  effective  program  of  monetary  restraint  is 
implemented.  Spending  slackens,  output  falls,  and 
input  demands  decline;  but  prices  nevertheless  con- 
tinue  upward  because  recent  cost  increases  are  still 
working  their  way  through  the  system  and  because 
inflationary  expectations  continue  to  mount.  But  as 
demand  pressures  slacken  throughout  successive 
stages  of production,  the  resulting  weakening  of costs 
eventually  leads  to  an  easing  of  prices  of  final  goods 
and  services.  As  the  actual  rate  of price  increase  falls 
and  remains  for  a  time  below  the  expected  rate,  ex- 
pectations  of  further  rises  are  gradually  revised 
downward.  Since  the  expected  rate  is  a  determinant 
of  the  actual  rate,  the  decrease  of  the  former  will 
produce  a  further  deceleration  of  the  latter.  But  the 
price-adjustment  and  expectations  lags  draw  out  the 
winding-down  process  and  the  actual  rate  of  inflation 
will  converge  on  its  new  equilibrium  level  only 
slowly. 
Factors  Retarding  Price  Adjustment  What  char- 
acteristics  of  a  modern  economy  account  for  the  lags 
described  in  the  foregoing  sections?  In  the  case  of 
the  price-adjustment  lag,  the  answer  is fairly  straight- 
forward.  The  lag  arises  from  institutional  arrange- 
ments  and  behavioral  practices  that  operate  to  make 
many  costs  and  prices  relatively  unresponsive  to 
short-run  shifts  in  demand.4  For  example,  long-term 
contracts  fix  some  wages  and  prices  for  substantial 
intervals  of  time.  In  addition,  regulated  rates  of 
4 Note  that  the  rigidities  or  inflexibilities  described  in  this 
section  refer  not  to  levels  of  particular  prices  and  costs 
but  rather  to  rates  of  change  of  those  variables.  The 
concept  of  rigid  price  levels,  of  course,  implies  the  com- 
plete  absence  of  price  change  and  is  thus  irrelevant  to 
the  analysis  of  inflation,  which  deals  with  continually 
rising,  not  constant,  prices.  The  problem  of  sluggish 
inflation  is  not  one  of  downward  inflexibility  of  price 
levels,  but  rather  the  resistance  of  rates  of  price  increase 
to  departures  from  the  established  trend. 
THE  INFLATIONARY  TRANSMISSION  MECHANISM 
PRICE-ADJUSTMENT  LAG  EXPECTATIONS  LAG 
A 
The  inflation  process  is  set  in  motion  by  a  rise  in  aggregate  demand  or  spending  to  a  level  in  excess  of  the  economy’s  long-run  capacity  to  produce. 
Businessmen  initially  respond  to  the  excess  demand  by  drawing  down  inventories  and  stepping  up  production.  Output  expands  and  the  demand  for 
resource  inputs  increases.  The  resulting  upward  pressure  on  resource  pricer  pusher  up  unit  production  costs  upon  which  product  prices  are  bared. 
Pricer  therefore  rise.  There  price  increases  induce  resource  owners  to  bargain  for  cost-of-living  pay  increaser  to  restore  real  earnings  eroded  by 
inflation.  This  feedback  of  product  prices  into  resource  costs  generates  additional  rounds  of  inflation.  The  price-adjustment  log  is  the  time  it  takes 
for  demand  pressure  to  affect  product  prices  through  the  complicated  channel  of  factor  costs.  If  the  inflation  persists,  it  eventually  induces  upward 
revisions  of  expected  future  rates  of  inflation,  which  feed  back  into  wages  and  prices  to  add  further  momentum  to  inflation.  Slow  to  build  up  and 
hard  to  reverse,  price  expectations  may  keep  wages  and  prices  increasing  long  after  demand  slackens.  The  expectations  lag  accounts  for  the  slow 
adjustment  of  the  expected  future  rate  of  inflation  to  changes  in  the  actual  current  rate. 
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administrative  and  judicial  proceedings.  Moreover, 
there  exists  a variety  of legal  restrictions  on wage  and 
price  flexibility,  including  minimum  wage  laws,  rent 
controls,  oil  price  ceilings,  interest-rate  ceilings,  and 
the  like.  There  are  also  numerous  government- 
sanctioned’  trade-restriction  and  price-fixing  arrange- 
ments,  such  as  production  and  marketing  quotas  for 
certain  agricultural  products,  import  quotas,  licensing 
and  other  restrictions  to  entry  of  professions,  and 
resale  price  maintenance  agreements.  All  these  con- 
tribute  to  the  stickiness  of  the  prices  affected. 
An  important  factor  retarding  price  adjustment  is 
the  inflexibility  of  many  wages.  Owing  to  long-term 
labor  contracts,  delays  in  the  adjustment  of  price 
expectations,  and  perhaps  also  workers’  money  illu- 
sion  (i.e.,  failure  to  distinguish  between  nominal 
and  real  wage  increases),  some  wages  tend  to  lag 
behind  inflation  during  certain  phases  of  the  business 
cycle.  When  inflation  accelerates  in  the  upswing, 
these  wages  are  often  slow  to  respond.  In  later 
stages  of  a  sharp  inflation,  however,  wage  increases 
may  outstrip  price  increases.  Wages  may  then  tend 
to  rise  ahead  of  prices  to  restore  real  earnings  eroded 
by  past  price  increases  and  to  protect  real  earnings 
from  anticipated  future  price  increases.  But  the  lag 
becomes  noticeable  again  when  inflation  is  subsiding 
as  the  rate  of  wage  increase  shows  little  tendency  to 
decelerate  even  though  the  rate  of  rise  of  other  prices 
is diminishing. 
Another  important  factor  contributing  to  price 
rigidity  is  the  price-setting  behavior  of  large-scale 
firms  operating  in  manufacturing  industries.  In  the 
typical  imperfectly  competitive  market,  the  price 
mechanism  works  in  the  long  run  as  prices  adjust  to 
clear  the  market.  In  the  short  run,  however,  prices 
are  relatively  inflexible.  Firms  do  not  typically  alter 
their  prices  in response  to  short-run  shifts  in demand. 
At  least  three  explanations  of  this  behavior  have 
been  offered. 
According  to  the  first,  firms  have  difficulty  dis- 
tinguishing  between  real  demand  shifts  specific  to  a 
particular  industry  and  shifts  in  nominal  aggregate 
demand  for  the  output  of  all  industries.  Because 
they  alter  only  the  composition  and  not  the  overall 
level  of  aggregate  demand,  specific  demand  shifts 
may  occur  without  inducing  a  corresponding  rise  in 
input  prices.  By  contrast,  an  economy-wide  demand 
increase  leads  to  an  equiproportional  bidding-up  of 
input  prices.  In  the  former  case,  industry  cost  and 
supply  curves  remain  unchanged.  In  the  latter  case, 
however,  cost  and  supply curves  shift  sharply  up- 
ward,  just  matching  the  rise  in demand.  The  rational 
entrepreneurial  reaction  to  the  former  is  a  change  in 
some  quantity  whereas  the  rational  reaction  to  the 
latter  is  a  change  in  prices.  But  when  aggregate 
demand  alters  there  is  a  good  likelihood  that  each 
producer  will  tend  to  regard  the  shift  in  demand  for 
his  product  as  special  to  him  and  so  adjust  quantity 
rather  than  price.  Only  later,  when  cost  changes 
become  widespread,  will  producers  correctly  perceive 
the  demand  shift  as  an  economy-wide  phenomenon. 
Then  and  only  then  will  they  start  to  change  their 
prices.  A  second  explanation  stresses  the  admini- 
strative  inconvenience  and  costs  of  frequent  price 
changes-for  example,  the  expense  of  printing  and 
disseminating  new  price  lists-as  a  reason  for  sticky 
oligopolistic  prices. 
Still  a  third  explanation  of  price  inflexibility  in 
imperfectly  competitive  markets  begins  with  the  ob- 
servation  that  in  the  complex  and  dynamic  modern 
industrial  economy  there  is  always  much  uncertainty 
about the  equilibrium  or  market-clearing  price.  Firms 
operating  in  this  kind  of  environment  try  to  avoid 
the  market  disruption,  confusion,  and  perhaps  even 
outright  price  warfare  that  could  result  if each  sought 
individually  to  determine  the  equilibrium  price.  In 
order  to  prevent  such  confusion  from  developing, 
firms  seek  ways  to  coordinate  price  changes.  Such 
coordination,  if  successful,  will  assure  that  firms 
raise  prices  in unison  and  that  price  changes  will  not 
occur  when  demand  shifts  are  thought  to  be  tempo- 
rary  and  reversible.  Firms  have  devised  several 
techniques  to  facilitate  price  coordination.  Infrequent 
price  changes  are  perhaps  the  simplest  of  these.  Price 
leadership  constitutes  another  such  technique.  In 
this  case,  one  firm-often  the  largest  in  the  industry 
-initiates  price  changes,  and  the  rest  more  or  less 
automatically  follow  that  price  change.  Perhaps  the 
most  widely  used  mechanism  for  coordinating  price 
behavior,  however,  is  to  base  selling  prices  on  unit 
labor  and  material  costs  that  are  the  same  for  all 
firms  in  the  industry.  This  practice  is  accomplished 
by  the  use  of  so-called  unit  cost  or  mark-up  pricing 
formulas. 
Unit-cost  pricing  is thought  to  be  characteristic  of 
many  of  the  large  oligopolistic  firms  that  operate  in 
American  industry.  The  mark-up  technique  of  pric- 
ing  involves  setting  prices  on  the  basis  of  a  constant 
percentage  markup  applied  to  production  costs  per 
unit  of  output  at  some  standard  level  of  plant  oper- 
ation  or  capacity  utilization.  The  chief  cost  compon- 
ents  are  unit  labor  and  unit  material  costs.  Included 
in  the  markup  is the  firm’s  profit  margin  per  unit  of 
output.  This  profit  margin  is usually  set  to  provide  a 
fixed  target  rate  of  return  on  equity.  Since  percent- 
age  markups  or  profit  margins  are  treated  as  fixed 
constants  in  unit-cost  pricing  formulas,  it  follows 
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determined,  that  is, they  result  solely  from  changes  in 
unit  labor  and  material  costs.  Prices  respond  to costs, 
not  to  demand.  Moreover,  since  standard  unit  labor 
and  material  costs  are  roughly  the  same  for  all 
firms  in  the  industry,  unit-cost  formulas  insure  that 
price  changes  will  be  uniform  throughout  the  in- 
dustry,  thereby  minimizing  the  risks  of  competitive 
price  undercutting.  Thus  unit-cost  pricing  is  con- 
sistent  with  the  slow  response  of  prices  to  shifts  in 
demand,  the  dependence  of  prices  on  costs,  and  the 
coordination  of  prices  in  concentrated  industries. 
A  Source  of  Confusion  The  long  delay  in  the 
adjustment  of  many  prices  to  demand  pressure  makes 
it  difficult  to  distinguish  cause  from  effect  in  the 
inflationary  sequence  and  contributes  to  confusion  in 
popular  understanding  of  the  source  of  inflation. 
The  sequence  of cost-price  responses  observed  in con- 
centrated  industries,  for  example,  may  suggest  that 
inflation  is initiated  by  autonomous  increases  in costs. 
The  use  in  such  industries  of  mark-up  or  unit-cost 
pricing  formulas,  and  the  resulting  dependence  of 
prices  on  costs,  means  that  firms  do  not  raise  prices 
unless  there  occurs  a  prior  increase  in  costs.  This 
cost-price  sequence,  with  costs  rising  first  and  prices 
later,  makes  it  appear  that  inflation  is caused  by 
rising  costs  when  in fact  excess  demand  is usually  the 
culprit.  For,  as  pointed  out  earlier,  both  the  cost 
increase  and  the  ability  of  firms  to  pass  on  this  in- 
crease  are  due  to  a  prior  expansion  in  aggregate  de- 
mand  for  final  goods  and  services. 
Similarly,  the  long  lag  in  the  response  of  oli- 
gopolistic  prices  to  prior  inflationary  pressures  may 
make  it  appear  that  large  firms  in  concentrated  in- 
dustries  play  an  important  independent  role  in  gen- 
erating  inflation.  Due  to  the  price-adjustment  lag, 
catch-up  price  increases  in  such  industries  are  often 
delayed  until  well  after  restrictive  policies  start 
to  turn  the  inflation  process  around.  The  apparent 
perverse  behavior  of  prices  when  markets  are  slack 
and  unemployment  is  rising  fosters  the  notion  of 
giant  firms  arbitrarily  exercising  monopoly  power  by 
effecting  autonomous  increases  in  prices  totally  inde- 
pendent  of  economic  conditions.5  But  it  should  be 
5 This  simplistic  cost-push  view  is  implausible  and  at  odds 
with  the  orthodox  theory  of  monopoly  behavior.  Accord- 
ing  to  the  latter  view,  a  monopolist  sets  a  relative  price 
for  his  product  that  maximize;  profits  in  real  term;  and 
maintains  that  real  price  by  adjusting  his  nominal  price 
to  allow  for  inflation.  The  logical  implication  is  that 
given  the  degree  of  monopoly  power  monopolists  would 
have  no  incentive  to  raise  prices  other  than  to  keep  pace 
or  catch  up  with  inflation.  With  real  prices  already 
established  at  profit-maximizing  levels,  any  further  up- 
ward  adjustment  would  reduce  profits.  On  the  other 
noted  that  the  price  increases  in  such  situations  can 
be  interpreted  as  constituting  a  delayed  reaction  to 
prior  economic  conditions  of  expanding  demand  and 
demand-induced  cost  increases  and  a  near  perfect 
example  of  the  price-adjustment  lag.  They  might 
well  be  interpreted  as  a  delayed  manifestation  of  the 
effects  of  a  general  inflation  rather  than  of  inflation- 
initiating  price  behavior. 
From  this  interpretation  it  follows  that  big  firms 
are  not  inflation  starters.  Nevertheless  they  may 
play  an  important  role  in  the  working  out  of  the 
inflationary  process.  Specifically,  they  may  be  infla- 
tion  prolongers.  It  follows  logically  from  the  mere 
existence  of  the  price-adjustment  lag  that  admini- 
stered  prices  do  not  usually  initiate  inflation.  Instead 
they  tend  to  slow  it  down.  By  doing  so,  however, 
they  extend  the  duration  of  inflation  and  protract 
the  period  necessary  for  its  reversal.  Administered 
prices  are  a  problem  because  they  act  to  prolong  in- 
flation  once  it  gets  started  and  because  they  delay 
the  success  and  exacerbate  the  adverse  side  effects  of 
anti-inflationary  stabilization  policy.  Just  as  in  an 
upward  price  spiral  sticky  administered  prices  retard 
the  spread  of  inflation,  so  when  the  spiral  is unwind- 
ing  they  delay  its  deceleration  and  impede  the  return 
to  price  stability. 
The  Expectations-Formation  Lag  As  noted 
earlier,  the  complicating  effects  of  the  so-called  price- 
adjustment  lag  are  reinforced  by  a  comparable  lag  in 
price  expectations,  which  tend  to  adjust  slowly  to 
the  actual  rate  of  inflation.  Why  does  this  expecta- 
tions  lag  occur  and  what  determines  its  length? 
The  expectations  lag  occurs  because  people  have 
imperfect  foresight  and  cannot  predict  the  future  with 
certainty.  If  the  future  were  known  with  absolute 
certainty,  there  would  be  no  forecasting  errors  and 
no  expectations  lag.  Anticipations  would  adapt  them- 
selves  instantaneously  to  realized  outcomes,  and  the 
expected  rate  of  inflation  would  always  be  the  one 
that  actually  occurred.  Although  the  future  is  em- 
phatically  uncertain,  people  nevertheless  try  to  make 
informed  guesses  about  it,  often  on  the  basis  of  anal- 
yses  of  the  past.  Thus  one  longstanding  explanation 
of  the  lag  holds  that  price  predictions  are  based  on 
perceived  trends  as estimated  from  past  price  experi- 
ence  perhaps  modified  by  current  information. 
hand,  if  prices  are  being  raised  to  exploit  hitherto  unex- 
ploited  monopoly  potential,  the  question  arises  as  to  why 
those  gains  were  foregone  in  the  past.  In  either  case, 
rising  real  prices  imply  non-rational  behavior.  It  is  true 
that  rising  real  prices  would  be  consistent  with  profit- 
maximizing  behavior  if  the  degree  of  monopoly  power 
were  increasing.  But  there  is  little  empirical  evidence 
that  monopoly  power  is  on  the  rise. 
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predictions  derived  from  them  change  slowly  over 
time.  Transitory  deviations  from  the  trend  have 
little  impact  on  expectations.  Thus  if  the  current 
rate  of  inflation  departs  from  the  recent  trend,  the 
expected  rate  will  remain  unchanged  for  a  time.  It 
requires  the  cumulative  influence  of  a  sustained 
change,  or  at  least  a  very  large  change,  in  the  actual 
rate  to  produce  a  change  in  the  expected  rate.  And 
even  then  the  adjustment  will  not  be  instantaneous 
or  complete.  The  expected  rate  will  continue  to  lag 
behind  the  current  rate.  As  time  passes,  however, 
and  the  new  rate  persists,  it  will  eventually  begin  to 
dominate  the  trend.  The  price  experience  of  the  more 
distant  past  gradually  will  be  forgotten  and  the  ex- 
pected  rate  will  finally  converge  on  the  actual  rate. 
The  length  of  time  required  for  this  convergence 
cannot  be  specified  with  any  degree  of  precision.  It 
depends  on  what  interval  or  intervals  of  the  past 
people  consider  in formulating  their  expectations  and, 
in  particular,  on  what  relative  weight  they  assign  to 
the  price  experience  of  the  more  distant  past.  In 
general,  the  greater  the  weight  assigned  to  the  distant 
past,  the  longer  will  be  the  lag.  The  lag  may  indeed 
be  quite  long  because  people,  in  formulating  their 
expectations,  may  look  not  merely  at  a  chronological 
succession  of  prior  years  but  rather  at  the  relevant 
phases  of  a  succession  of  past  inflation-recession 
cycles  and  at  the  public  policy  response  to  these  epi- 
sodes.  Looking  back  at  a  succession  of  what  might 
be  regarded  as  stop-go  policies,  for  example,  people 
may  expect  the  recession  phase  to  be  brief  and  to  be 
followed  immediately  by  an  expansionary  phase  that 
experience  suggests  may  bring  new  inflationary  pres- 
sures.  To  use  a  popular  expression,  they  may  “look 
across  the  valley.” 
A  second  factor  that  may  affect  the  length  of  the 
expectations  lag  is  the  variability  of  the  rate  of  in- 
flation  about  the  trend.  The  greater  the  variability 
of  the  actual  rate  of  inflation  the  greater  is the  finan- 
cial  incentive  to  forecast  it  more  accurately,  i.e.,  to 
predict  the  variations,  not  just  the  trend.  Accord- 
ingly,  forecasts  of  the  inflation  rate  will  be  revised 
more  frequently  and  will  rely  more  heavily  on current 
and  recent  information.  The  whole  time  frame  em- 
ployed  in  observing  past  price  behavior  and  past 
forecasting  errors  will  contract  and  shift  toward  the 
present.  Correspondingly,  the  expectations  lag  will 
shorten. 
Time  Lags  and  Demand  Management  Policies 
This  article  has  focused  on  the  role  of  time  lags  in 
the  inflationary  transmission  mechanism.  These  lags 
raise  several  potential  problems  for  demand  manage- 
ment  (i.e.,  monetary  and  fiscal)  policy.  First,  if  the 
lags  are  variable  and  hard  to  predict,  policymakers 
may  experience  difficulty  in  accurately  forecasting 
when  their  policy  actions  will  take  effect  on  the  rate 
of  inflation.  In  this  case  discretionary  policymaking 
becomes  a  potentially  risky  undertaking.  That  is, 
unpredictability  of  the  lag  effects  of  policy  may 
render  the  latter  destabilizing  rather  than  stabilizing. 
For  this  reason,  some  analysts  have  advocated  the 
abandonment  of  discretionary  policy  in  favor  of fixed 
policy  rules.  Other  observers,  however,  argue  that 
the  lags  are  not  so  variable  and  unpredictable  as  to 
defeat  effective  policy  forecasting  and  control.  Actu- 
ally,  little  is  known  about  the  variability  of  the  lags. 
The  evidence  is  simply  not  sufficient  to  settle  the 
issues.  Whether  rules  would  be  superior  to  dis- 
cretion  in  the  conduct  of  stabilization  policy  remains 
an  open  question. 
Additional  policy  problems  arise  from  the  length 
rather  than  the  variability  and  unpredictability  of  the 
lags.  As  previously  mentioned,  the  price-adjustment 
and  expectations  lags  extend  the  time  it  takes  for  a 
policy-induced  change  in  spending  to  work  its  way 
through  to  the  rate  of  inflation.  Moreover,  they  in- 
fluence  the  pattern  of  response  of  quantities  and 
prices  to  inflationary  stimuli.  Specifically,  they  cause 
the  quantity  response  to  precede  the  price  response. 
When  spending  changes,  output  and  employment 
adjust  first,  prices  only  later.  What  are  the  policy 
implications  of  such  consequences? 
First,  owing  to  the  slow  response  of  inflation  to  a 
spending  change,  anti-inflationary  monetary-fiscal 
policy  can  be  expected  to  produce  observed  results 
only  after  a  corresponding  lag.  Quick  monetary 
remedies  for  inflation  are  not  likely  to  be  found. 
Moreover,  since  the  initial  impact  of  a  change  in 
spending  is  on  output  and  employment  rather  than 
on  prices,  a move  to  monetary  restraint  would  almost 
surely  entail  a recession  or  at least  a  marked  retarda- 
tion  in  the  rate  of  expansion  of  the  economy.  In 
short,  a  temporary  but  protracted  period  of  unem- 
ployment,  idle  capacity,  and  sluggish  growth  might 
have  to  be  endured  if  restrictive  policy  were  to  ‘be 
successful  in  permanently  lowering  the  rate  of  in- 
flation. 
Second,  due  to  the  difference  in  timing  of  the  re- 
sponse  of  output  and  prices  to  a  spending  change, 
anti-inflationary  policy  may  appear  impotent  or  even 
perverse.  Because  inflationary  movements  tend  to 
subside  so  slowly,  prices  may  continue  to  rise  long 
after  output  and  employment  have  turned  down. 
Thus  inflation  can  persist  even  in  slack  markets,  a 
condition  variously  known  as  inflationary  recession, 
stagflation,  or  slumpflation.  During  such  periods, 
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ing  both  the  slump  and  the  accompanying  inflation. 
At  such  times,  monetary  authorities,  anxious  to 
achieve  quick  and  relatively  painless  results,  may  be 
tempted  to  abandon  the  policy  of  restraint  as  ineffec- 
tive  at  best  and  harmful  at  worst. 
Third,  the  same  asymmetrical  pattern  of  response 
-output  first,  prices  only  much  later-may  create 
the  dangerous  illusion  that  expansionary  policy  in  the 
upswing  can  achieve  permanent  gains  in  output  and 
employment  at  the  cost  of  little  additional  inflation. 
If  inflation  proceeds  as  described  in  the  foregoing 
sections,  this  view  may  have  unfortunate  conse- 
quences.  For  it  is virtually  impossible  to  peg  output 
and  employment  above  their  natural  or  equilibrium 
levels  without  continuously  accelerating  the  rate  of 
inflation.  In  any  case,  time  lags  may  well  compound 
the  problem  of  curbing  inflation  by  leading  to  the 
undue  prolongation  of  expansionary  policy,  thus  in- 
creasing  the  momentum  behind  inflation  when  it 
finally  occurs. 
Indeed,  these  time  lags,  together  with  society’s 
commitment  to  full  employment,  may  bias  monetary- 
fiscal  policy  toward  inflation  over  the  entire  policy 
cycle.  The  lags  cause  output  and  employment  to 
adjust  before  prices.  Consequently,  on  the  upside  the 
desired  output  results  of  demand  expansion  occur 
before  the  undesired  inflationary  results  thus  en- 
couraging  the  prolongation  of  policy  stimulus.  On 
the  downside,  however,  the  painful  effects  come  first 
as  restrictive  policy  produces  undesired  and  costly 
rises  in  unemployment  with  little  initial  effect  on  the 
rate  of  inflation.  Not  surprisingly,  the  appearance  of 
painful  rather  than  desired  results  leads  to  impatience 
with  restrictive  policies  and  often  to  their  premature 
reversal.  The  policies  are  abandoned  before  they 
have  a  chance  to  eliminate  the  inflation  generated  in 
the  preceding  upswing.  The  net  result  is  that  re- 
strictive  policies  reduce  the  inflation  rate  less  than 
expansionary  policies  raise  it  and  inflation  ratchets 
upwards. 
Direct  Controls  If  orthodox  demand-manage- 
ment  policies  cannot  curb  inflation  without  causing 
painful  rises  in unemployment,  then  what  other  means 
can  be  utilized?  One  suggestion  is to  reimpose  direct 
wage-price  controls.  Several  arguments  have  been 
advanced  in  behalf  of  controls.  The  most  naive  is 
that  controls  can  constrain  the  rate  of  inflation  while 
the  authorities  pursue  demand-expansion  policies 
necessary  to  insure  full  employment.  This  argument 
assumes  that  the  rate  of  inflation  can  be  permanently 
pegged  in  the  face  of  persistent  excess  demand.  In 
fact,  however,  the  rate  of  inflation  tends  to  gravitate 
to  an  equilibrium  level  where  excess  demand  is zero. 
Controls  can  delay  the  adjustment  to  that  level  but 
they  cannot  stop  it.  The  equilibrium  rate  of  inflation 
will  inevitably  be  reached  either  via  evasion,  i.e., 
through  black  markets,  or  after  the  controls  are 
lifted.  In  the  final  analysis,  controls  will  have  no 
effect  on  the  equilibrium  rate  of  inflation,  which  is 
determined  by  aggregate  demand.  It  logically  fol- 
lows.  therefore,  that  a  decrease  in aggregate  demand, 
not  the  application  of  controls,  is  the  sine  qua  non 
for  the  reduction  of  the  inflation  rate. 
Controls  and  the  Expectations  Lag  A  more 
sophisticated  argument  for  controls  calls  for  using 
them  as  a  supplement  to  monetary  and  fiscal  policy. 
The  prescription  here  calls  for  first  employing  a 
monetary-fiscal  policy  sufficient  to  eliminate  excess 
aggregate  demand  and  then  using  controls  to  speed 
the  actual  rate  of  inflation  to  its  new  equilibrium 
level.  In  this  view,  a  controls  program  properly  co- 
ordinated  with  restrictive  demand  policy  could  help 
short-circuit  the  painful  process  of  winding-down  a 
stubborn  inflation. 
The  foregoing  argument  rests  on  the  belief  that 
controls  can  exert  an  independent  influence  on  other- 
wise  sticky  price  expectations.  Eradication  of  infla- 
tionary  expectations  is of course  a prerequisite  to  the 
elimination  of  inflation,  since  the  former  is  a  deter- 
minant  of  the  latter.  The  problem  is how  to  dampen 
expectations.  The  orthodox  method  is  to  create 
slack  (excess  supply)  in  the  economy,  thus  causing 
the  actual  rate  of  inflation  to  fall  below  the  expected 
rate,  inducing  a  downward  revision  of  the  latter. 
Owing  to  the  expectations  lag,  however,  this  adjust- 
ment  may  be  a  slow  process  and  a  prime  example  of 
how  sluggish  price  anticipations  can  impede  the  re- 
turn  to  price  stability.  Direct  controls  are  viewed 
as  a  means  of  speeding  the  expectations  adjustment 
and  thus  reducing  the  duration  and  severity  of  the 
economic  slowdown  necessary  to  bring  inflation  to 
its  equilibrium  level  determined  by  aggregate  de- 
mand. 
How  could  controls  influence  expectations  ?  Two 
mechanisms  have  been  suggested.  First,  the  mere 
announcement  of  controls  might  alter  expectations  in 
the  desired  direction.  Second,  by  freezing  prices  or 
at  least  severely  constraining  their  rate  of  rise,  con- 
trols  would  cause  the  gap  between  the  expected  and 
actual  rates  of  inflation  to  be  greater  than  it  would 
otherwise  be.  Assuming  that  the  rate  at  which  ex- 
pectations  are  revised  varies  directly  with  the  size 
of  the  gap,  controls  would  thus  accelerate  the  down- 
ward  revision  of  expectations. 
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influence  of  controls.  To  have  anything  more  than  a 
temporary  impact  on  price  expectations,  the  controls 
must  convince  the  public  that  the  trend  of  prices 
when  controls  are  in  force  is  a  reliable  indicator  of 
the  likely  future  trend  of  prices  after  they  are  lifted. 
The  public  may  be  hard  to  convince,  especially  if  the 
controls  have  failed  to  stop  inflation  in  the  past. 
Aside  from  this  point,  it  is  hard  to  understand  why 
controls  should  have  a  stronger  impact  on  expecta- 
tions  than,  say,  an  announced  policy  of  a  permanent 
reduction  in  the  growth  rate  of  the  money  stock. 
What  counts  is  not  the  means  by  which  the  govern- 
ment  announces  its  determination  to  permanently 
reduce  inflation  but  that  those  intentions  be  believed. 
Controls  and  the  Price-Adjustment  Lag  It 
should  be  noted,  moreover,  that  even  if  controls 
could  reduce  the  expectations  lag,  they  would  tend  to 
lengthen  the  price-adjustment  lag,  and  this  would 
impede  the  return  to  equilibrium.  The  attainment  of 
economic  equilibrium  requires  that  two  conditions  be 
satisfied.  First,  inflation  must  be  correctly  antici- 
pated,  i.e.,  the  expected  rate  of  inflation  must  equal 
the  actual  rate.  Second,  the  equilibrium  structure  of 
relative  prices  must  be  restored.  Lagging  prices  and 
costs  must  be  allowed  to  catch  up  to  and  reestablish 
their  equilibrium  relationships  with  other  prices  that 
have  already  adjusted  to  inflation.  Controls  inter- 
rupt  this  catch-up  process  by  arbitrarily  freezing  all 
prices  and  costs.  As  a  result,  catch-up  adjustments 
are  postponed  until  the  controls  are  lifted  and  account 
for  the  observed  tendency  for  prices  to  rise  sharply 
when  controls  are  terminated.  Note  that  this  prob- 
lem  would  not  arise  if  controls  could  distinguish  be- 
tween  legitimate  catch-up  and  unwarranted  anticipa- 
tory  price  increases.  In  practice,  however,  the  two 
are  virtually  indistinguishable  and  controls  prohibit 
both.  By  forcing  the  postponement  of  catch-up  price 
increases,  controls  probably  protract  the  inflationary 
process  and  lengthen  the  interval  required  for  the 
rate  of  inflation  to  reach  its  equilibrium  level.  In 
the  interim,  the  controls-distorted  price  structure 
generates  inefficiency,  resource  misallocation,  and  in- 
come  redistribution.  Clearly,  in  the  context  of  the 
explanation  presented  here,  controls  offer  no  solution 
to  the  problem  of  persistent  inflation. 
Other  Proposed  Solutions  One  of  the  more 
promising,  and  yet  untried,  solutions  to  the  lag 
problem  is  indexation,  i.e.,  the  inclusion  of  pur- 
chasing  power  clauses  in  all  contracts.  With  all 
contractual  prices  tied  to  automatic  cost  of  living 
escalators,  inflation  would  be  transmitted  more 
quickly  and  evenly  throughout  all  markets,  thereby 
permitting  faster  restoration  of  relative  price  equilib- 
rium.  On  the  downside,  indexation  could  help  reduce 
expectations  more  quickly,  thus  shortening  the  time 
required  to  remove  inflation.  Critics  argue  that 
indexation  would  intensify  inflation.  This  criticism 
confuses  the  level  of  inflation  with  the  speed  with 
which  inflationary  impulses  are  propagated  through 
the  economy.  There  is no  reason  to  believe  that  esca- 
lator  clauses  by  themselves  would  have  any  effect 
on  the  rate  of  inflation.  The  speed  of inflation  would 
be  increased,  to  be  sure,  but  the  level  of  inflation 
would  not  necessarily  be any  higher.  Another  partial 
solution  to  the  lag  problem  would  be  to  shorten  the 
length  of  contracts.  For  example,  trade-union  collec- 
tive  bargaining  agreements  could  be  renegotiated 
more  frequently  as could  long-term  contracts  for  raw 
materials  and  energy  supplies. 
A  distinction  should  be  made  here  between  reforms 
designed  to  increase  the  speed  of  response  of  inflation 
to  changes  in  aggregate  demand  and  reforms  aimed 
at  reducing  the  equilibrium  rate  of  unemployment, 
i.e.,  the  unemployment  rate  that,  given  the  inevitable 
frictions,  rigidities,  and  imperfections  in the  economy, 
is just  consistent  with  zero  excess  demand  and  stable 
(nonaccelerating,  nondecelerating)  rates  of  inflation. 
Indexation  falls  in  the  former  category  while  so- 
called  structural  reforms  fall  in  the  latter.  Structural 
reforms  refer  to  microeconomic  policies  directed  at 
improving  the  efficiency  of  labor  and  product  mar- 
kets.  True,  these  policies  may  increase  the  respon- 
siveness  of  inflation  by  eradicating  market  imperfec- 
tions  that  inhibit  price  flexibility.  But  their  chief 
purpose  is  to  reduce  the  equilibrium  rate  of  unem- 
ployment  at  which  the  demand  for  and  supply  of labor 
are  in  balance  and  at  which  any  stable  rate  of  infla- 
tion  (including  a  zero  rate)  is possible.  By  so  doing, 
structural  policies  may  make  it  easier  in  at  least  two 
ways  to  bring  inflation  under  control.  First,  they  may 
render  the  equilibrium  rate  of  unemployment  and 
the  corresponding  zero  or  other  desired  steady-state 
rate  of  inflation  a  more  acceptable  policy  option.  By 
bringing  equilibrium  unemployment  down  to  a  soci- 
ally  tolerable  level,  structural  policies  reduce  the  risk 
that  political  pressure  will  be  put  on the  authorities  to 
peg  unemployment  at  even  lower  levels  that  can  only 
be  maintained  by  a  constantly  accelerating  rate  of 
inflation.  Second,  they  reduce  the  severity  of  the 
recession  necessary  to  achieve  price  stability.  Since  a 
dampening  of  inflation  requires  a  temporary  rise  in 
unemployment  above  its  equilibrium  level,  it  follows 
that  any  policy  that  reduces  the  latter  also  reduces 
the  transitional  level  of  unemployment. 
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from  the  preceding  analysis  are  straightforward. 
Admit  that  there  are  no  quick  and  easy  solutions  to 
the  inflation  problem.  Realize  that  any  serious  anti- 
inflation  program  faces  the  formidable  obstacles  of 
entrenched  inflationary  expectations  and  eroded 
public  confidence  in  the  government’s  ability  and 
determination  to  fight  inflation  and  to  tolerate  the 
resulting  economic  slack.  Comprehend  that,  obstacles 
notwithstanding,  the  costs  of  removing  inflation  may 
be  far  less  than  the  costs  of  accepting  it  as  a  perma- 
nent  way  of  life.6 On  the  basis  of  this  cost-benefit 
analysis  establish  a permanent  target  rate  of  inflation. 
Rely  on  demand-management  (i.e.,  monetary  and 
fiscal)  policies  to  bring  inflation  down  to  the  desired 
target  level.  Assuming  that  level  is  zero,  reduce  the 
rate  of  monetary  expansion  and  trim  budget  deficits 
until  the  growth  rate  of  total  spending  (aggregate 
demand)  is equal  to  the  long-term  trend  growth  rate 
6 A  policy  of  accommodating  permanent  inflation  is  likely 
to  lead  to  a  pattern  of  accelerating  and  highly  erratic 
(variable)  inflation.  Such  inflation,  by  virtue  of  its  vari- 
ability  and  unpredictability,  imposes  substantial  costs  on 
the  economy.  Not  only  will  there  be  repeated  falls  in 
output  and  employment  whenever  the  inflation  rate  drops, 
but  the  very  unpredictability  of  volatile  inflation  in- 
creases  business  uncertainty,  makes  capital  investment 
decisions  riskier.  diverts  energies  and  skills  from  industry 
and  production  into  speculative  activities  designed  to  beat 
the  inflation,  and  reduces  the  information  content  of 
market  prices  thereby  making  the  price  system  a  less 
efficient  mechanism  for  coordinating  economic  activity. 
All  this  makes  for  a  wasteful  and  inefficient  use  of  re- 
sources  that  results  in  a  lower  level  of  output  than  the 
economy  is  capable  of  producing.  The  costs  of  inflation 
can  be  measured  in  terms  of  this  lost  output.  Similarly, 
the  benefits  of  removing  inflation  can  be  reckoned  in 
terms  of  the  increased  output  that  would  result. 
of  real  output  (aggregate  supply).  Eschew  controls. 
Recognize  that  a  reduction  of  inflation  necessitates  a 
transitional  rise  in  unemployment  above  its  equilib- 
rium  level  with  the  extent  and  duration  of  the  rise 
depending  upon  the  speed  with  which  inflation  is  to 
be  removed.  In  other  words,  recognize  that  quick 
eradication  of  inflation  requires  high  excess  unem- 
ployment  for  a relatively  short  period  whereas  slower 
eradication  requires  a  lower  level  of  excess  unem- 
ployment  for  a prolonged  period.  Choose  the  desired 
path  to  price  stability  always  realizing  that  the  choice 
is  between  higher  excess  unemployment  for  a  short 
time  or  lower  excess  unemployment  for  a  long  time. 
Acknowledge  also  that  the  severity  and  duration  of 
the  recession  necessary  to  eliminate  inflation  depends 
upon  the  responsiveness  of  wages  and  prices  to  defla- 
tionary  pressure  and  upon  the  adjustment  speed  of 
price  expectations.  Use  indexation,  if  possible,  to 
increase  the  downward  flexibility  of wages  and  prices. 
Similarly,  seek  to  influence  expectations  by  prean- 
nouncing  the  inflation  target  and  by  adhering  to  a 
path  consistent  with  achieving  it.  Once  inflation  is 
removed,  maintain  price  stability  by  avoiding  expan- 
sionary  policies  that  generate  excess  demand.  Bal- 
ance  the  budget  each  year  and  maintain  a  money 
stock  growth  rate  roughly  equal  to  the  long-term 
growth  rate  of  real  output.  If  society  is  unwilling  to 
tolerate  the  equilibrium  unemployment  rate  associated 
with  price  stability,  design  structural  policies  to  lower 
that  rate  by  improving  the  efficiency  of  labor  and 
product  markets.  If  society  is still  unwilling  to  accept 
that  rate,  face  up  to  the  fact  that  price  stability  may 
be  impossible  to  achieve. 
APPENDIX 
THE  TREATMENT  OF  LAGS  IN  SIMPLE  ANALYTICAL  MODELS 
OF  THE  INFLATIONARY  TRANSMISSION  MECHANISM 
The  inflationary  mechanism  and  its  constituent 
lags  can  be  summarized  in  the  form  of  simple  ana- 
lytical  models.1  Economists  have  long  used  such 
models  to  study  how  lags  affect  the  speed  and  dura- 
tion  of  inflation.  More  recently,  such  models  have 
been  employed  to  estimate  the  impact  of  lags  on  the 
effectiveness  of  anti-inflationary  policy.  These 
1 For  a  thorough  review  of  inflation  models  see  the 
article  by  Laidler  and  Parkin  [7]  especially  pp.  774-81 
that  describe  models  similar  to  the  one  presented  in  this 
appendix. 
models  specify  the  chief  determinants  of the  current 
and  expected  future  rates  of  inflation.  They  also 
specify  the  lags  linking  the  variables  and  determining 
the  pattern  of  their  interaction  over  time.  Compris- 
ing  these  models  are  a price-adjustment  equation  and 
an  expectations-formation  equation.2  The  price- 
adjustment  equation  explains  how  the  current  rate  of 
inflation  responds  to  inflationary  expectations  and  to 
2 Some  models  of  the  inflationary  process  contain  a  third 
equation  that  explains  how  inflation-generating  excess 
aggregate  demand  is  determined. 
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representing  the  price-adjustment  delay.  The  expec- 
tations-formation  equation  explains  how  price  antici- 
pations  are  generated  and  revised  in  the  light  of  past 
price  experience.  As  shown  below,  the  latter  equa- 
tion  expresses  the  expected  future  rate  of  inflation  as 
an  exponentially-declining  weighted  average  of  past 
rates  of  inflation. 
A  crude  version  of  this  two-equation  model  is 
presented  in  the  following  paragraphs.3  It  should  be 
strongly  emphasized,  however,  that  the  model  con- 
stitutes  a  severe  oversimplification  of  a  complex 
process  and  thus  should  be  interpreted  with  some 
skepticism.  Presented  solely  as  an  illustration,  the 
model  purposely  omits  many  of  the  variables  and 
behavioral  relationships  that  a  more  complex,  so- 
phisticated,  and  realistic  model  would  contain. 
The  Price-Adjustment  Equation  Most  models 
of  the  inflationary  mechanism  contain  an  equation 
that  explains  how  the  current  rate  of  inflation  is 
determined,  i.e.,  the  rate  at  which  businessmen  mark 
up their  prices.  One  such  equation  shows  the  rate  of 
price  inflation  p  varying  directly  with  lagged  excess 
demand  x-1  and  with  the  expected  rate  of  price  in- 
crease  pe.  The  equation  is  written  as  follows: 
(1)  p  =  ax-l  +  pe-1 
where  p  is  the  current  rate  of  inflation  (expressed 
as  a  percentage  rate),  x-1  is  excess  demand  lagged 
one  period,  pe-1 is  the  present  period’s  expected  rate 
of  inflation  forecast  at  the  end  of  the  preceding 
period,  and  a  is  a  coefficient  specifying  how  much 
each  unit  of  lagged  excess  demand  contributes  to  the 
rate  of  price  increase.  The  excess  demand  variable 
x  is measured  in  terms  of  real  output  since  business- 
men  initially  respond  to  changes  in  demand  by  alter- 
ing  quantity  produced.  More  specifically,  excess 
demand x  is  represented  by  the  difference  between 
actual  and  capacity  real  output.  Actual  output  can 
exceed  capacity  output  because  the  latter  is  defined 
not  as  the  absolute  physical  limit  or  maximum  ceiling 
level  of  output  but  rather  as  the  output  associated 
with  the  economy’s  normal  or  standard  level  of  oper- 
ation. 
Equation  (1)  states  that  if  aggregate  demand  and 
supply  are  equal  so  that  there  exists  no  excess  de- 
3 The  model  presented  here  is  adapted  from  similar 
models  developed  by  Phillip  Cagan  and  David  Laidler. 
See  Cagan  [2;  pp.  94-6]  and  Laidler  [5,  6].  For  an 
elementary  description  of  Laidler’s  model,  together  with 
a  diagrammatic  illustration  of  its  dynamic  properties  see 
Laidler  and  Parkin  [7;  pp.  776-8]. 
mand  (x  =  zero),  then  actual  price  inflation  p  will 
just  equal  expected  inflation  pe-1,  i.e.,  businessmen 
will  be  raising  their  prices  at  the  rate  at  which  they 
expect  other  businessmen  to  be  raising  theirs.  If, 
however,  an  expansion  in  demand  raises  x  above 
zero,  businessmen  will  eventually  react  to  the  excess 
demand  by  raising  prices  at  a  rate  in  excess  of 
the  expected  rate  of  inflation.  This  price  response, 
however,  is  not  instantaneous.  For  a  while,  quanti- 
ties  rather  than  prices  tend  to  absorb  the  impact  of 
excess  demand  as  businessmen  temporarily  expand 
output  and  perhaps  allow  their  inventories  to  be 
depleted.  These  quantity  changes  affect  demands  for 
and  prices  of  factor  resources  and  ultimately  invoke 
cost  increases  that  signal  the  desirability  of  raising 
the  rate  at which  prices  are  marked  up.  Later,  there- 
fore,  businessmen  respond  to  the  excess  demand  by 
raising  prices.  The  same  price-adjustment  lag  oper- 
ates  on  the  downside.  Thus  if  a  subsequent  slack- 
ening  of  spending  causes  excess  demand  x  to  become 
negative  (i.e.,  a situation  of  excess  supply)  the  actual 
rate  of  price  increase  p  will  eventually  fall  below  the 
expected  rate  pe-1.  The  key  word  here  is  eventually 
because  the  lag  prevents  prices  from  responding 
immediately  to  shifts  in  demand. 
The  Price-Response  Lag  The  one-period  delay 
on  the  excess  demand  variable  symbolizes  the  ten- 
dency  for  price  adjustments  to  lag  behind  shifts  in 
demand.4 This price-adjustment  lag is  meant  to 
account  or  the  time  it  takes  for  demand  pressure  to 
work  backward  through  the  interindustry  structure 
and  for  costs  to  work  forward.  To  summarize,  the 
association  of  the  price-adjustment  lag  with  the  ex- 
cess  demand  variable  x  implies  that  the  impact  of  a 
shift  in  demand  is  initially  registered  on  x.  That 
impact  is not  immediately  transmitted  to  prices,  how- 
ever.  Instead  it  is transmitted  first  to  quantities  and 
subsequently  to  costs.  Prices  do  not  respond  until 
rising  costs  induce  them  to  do so. 
The  Expectations-Formation  Equation  The  sec- 
ond  equation  of  the  model  is  the  expectations-forma- 
tion  equation.  It  is  written  as  follows: 
(2)  pe =  bp  +  (l-b)pe-1 
or,  alternatively,  as 
(2a)  pe  -  pe-1  =  b(p-pe-1). 
4 More  sophisticated  models  would  express  the  delayed 
price  adjustment  as  a  distributed  lag,  i.e.,  a  lag  spread 
over  a  number  of  time  periods. 
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rate  of  inflation  pe-pe-1  is  proportional  to  the 
amount  by  which  the  period’s  actual  inflation  p  devi- 
ated  from  expected  inflation  as  forecast  at  the  end 
of  the  preceding  period  pe-1 with  the  factor  of  pro- 
portionality  b having  a value  between  zero  and  unity. 
Embodied  in  the  equation  is  a  particular  theory- 
the  so-called  adaptive-expectations  or  error-learning 
hypothesis-of  how  inflationary  expectations  are 
formed.  According  to  the  error-learning  hypothesis, 
people  formulate  expectations  about  the  inflation 
rate,  observe  the  discrepancy  between  the  actual  and 
anticipated  rates,  and  then  revise  the  anticipated  rate 
by  some  fraction  of  the  error  between  the  actual  and 
anticipated  rates.  Expectations  are  revised  in  pro- 
portion  to  the  error  associated  with  the  previous 
level  of  expectations. 
It  can  also  be  shown  that  the  adaptive-expectations 
hypothesis  is  equivalent  to  the  theory  that  people 
formulate  price  expectations  from  prior  price  experi- 
ence  by  looking  at  a  geometrically-weighted  average 
of past  rates  of  inflation  with  the  weights  diminishing 
exponentially  as time  recedes.  This  alternative  inter- 
pretation  of  the  adaptive  expectations  hypothesis  is 
written  as  follows  : 
Here  is  the summation  operator  indicating  the 
mathematical  operation  of  adding  a  succession  or 
series  of  terms,  in this  case  the  weighted  past  rates  of 
inflation.  The summation  index i  represents  each 
past  time  period  starting  with  the  most  recent  (i=O) 
and  extending  backward  to  the  most  distant  (i  =  ). 
The  variables  p-i  are  the  past  rates  of  inflation,  one 
for  each  of  the  i  periods  stretching  backward  into 
time.  Attached  to  each  past  rate  of  inflation  p-i  is a 
corresponding  weight  that  measures  the  degree  of 
influence  that  each  p-i  has  on  the  formation  of  price 
expectations  pe.  The  weights  are  expressed  as 
(l-b)i,  one  for  each  of  the  i  time  periods.  Since, 
as  mentioned  previously,  the  coefficient  of  expecta- 
tions  b  is  a  fraction  whose  magnitude  lies  between 
zero  and  one,  it  follows  that  the  term  (l-b)  will 
also  be a fraction.  And  since  any  given  fraction  raised 
to  progressively  higher  integral  powers  yields  suc- 
cessively  smaller  numbers,  it  follows  that  the  weights 
(l-b)i  must  decrease  as  the  exponent  i  increases, 
i.e.,  the  weights  must  diminish  the  further  back  in 
time  one  looks. 
Graphically,  the  weights  are  distributed  along  an 
exponentially  declining  curve  whose  slope  reflects 
the  speed  of  adjustment  of  expectations.  A  steep 
slope  represents  a  short  weighting  scheme,  implying 
swift  adjustment,  and  conversely  for  a  relatively  flat 
slope.  The  slope  itself  is  determined  by  the  magni- 
tude  of  the  fraction  (1-b).  A  value  of  (1-b)  close 
to  zero  implies  that  the  weights  decline  rapidly  as 
time  recedes,  and  so  future  price  expectations  depend 
primarily  on  recent  experience.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  (l-b)  is  closer  to  1  in  value,  rates  of  inflation 
from  the  more  distant  past  enter  the  equation  with 
higher  weights,  and  recent  price  information  is  dis- 
counted  more  heavily.  Econometricians  who  have 
attempted  to  fit  equation  (2b)  to  the  statistical  data 
have  found  the  fraction  (l-b)  to  be  both  signifi- 
cantly  greater  than  zero  and  less  than  1.  These 
findings  imply  that  while  people  generally  assign 
higher  weights  to  more  recent  phenomena,  these 
weights  do  not  dominate  the  cumulative  weight  of  all 
past  price  experience.  In  short,  price  anticipations 
continue  to  reflect  past  price  experience,  which  ex- 
plains  why  the  expected  future  rate  of  inflation  does 
not  adjust  instantaneously  to  the  current  rate. 
To  summarize,  equation  (2b)  states  that  the  ex- 
pected  future  rate  of  change  of  prices  is  based  on  a 
geometrically  declining  weighted  average  of  past 
rates  of  change  of  prices.  The  equation  therefore 
constitutes  a  precise  specification  of  the  common- 
sense  notion  that  expectations  are  based  on  past 
experience  with  more  emphasis  given  to  recent,  rather 
than  distant,  experience. 
The  Expectations  Lag  The  preceding  discussion 
clearly  implies  that  the  length  of  the  expectations  lag 
can  be  defined  in  terms  of  the  coefficient  of  expecta- 
tions  b.  The  coefficient  b itself  measures  the  speed  of 
adjustment  of  expectations  to  experience,  i.e.,  the 
quickness  of  response  of  pe  to  realized  actual  rates 
of  inflation  p. 
The  average  length  of  the  expectations  lag  is  the 
counterpart  of  the  speed  of  adjustment.  This  lag  is 
expressed  as  (l-b)/b.  The  closer  b  is  to  1,  the 
shorter  the  lag.  In  the  extreme  case  where  b  equals 
1,  the  lag  is  nonexistent,  and  the  expected  rate  of 
inflation  adjusts  instantaneously  to  the  current  rate. 
Thus  when  b  is  set  equal  to  1  in  the  expectations- 
formation  equation 
(2)  pe =  bp  +  (1-b)pe-1 
the  equation  collapses  to  pe =  p,  i.e.,  anticipated  and 
actual  inflation  are  always  identical. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  lag  will  be  longer  the 
closer  b  is  to  zero.  In  the  extreme  case  where  b 
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pected  rate  of  inflation  never  changes.  This  result 
can  be  demonstrated  by  setting  b at  zero  in  equation 
(2),  which  yields  pe  =  pe-l,  showing  that  the  ex- 
pected  rate  of  inflation  always  remains  unaltered 
from  the  preceding  period.  In  short,  if  b  is  zero, 
the  lag  is  of  infinite  length  and  expectations  never 
change  regardless  of  what  is  happening  to  the  actual 
rate  of  inflation. 
One  possible  shortcoming  of  the  adaptive  expecta- 
tions  or  error-learning  model  is  that  it  regards  the 
speed  of  adjustment  or  coefficient  of  expectations  b 
as  a  fixed  constant.  And  since  b  determines  both 
the  length  of  the  expectations  lag  and  the  slope  of  the 
weighting  pattern  used  to  distribute  the  lag,  it  follows 
that  the  model,  by  implication,  also  treats  these 
phenomena  as  given  constants.  This  treatment  is 
surely  too  restrictive.  Some  analysts  think,  contrary 
to  the  model,  that  the  coefficient  b is capable  of  being 
influenced  by  outside  information  and  by  the  behavior 
of  the  rate  of  inflation  itself.  For  example,  it  has 
been  suggested  that  the  sensitivity  of  price  anticipa- 
tions  is greater  and  the  corresponding  adjustment  lag 
shorter  for  high  and  volatile  rates  of  inflation  than 
for  low  and  steady  rates.  Finally,  some  observers 
believe  that  the  expectations  coefficient  can  be  influ- 
enced  by  government  policy.  In  fact,  this  idea  con- 
stitutes  one  rationale  for  direct  wage  and  price 
controls.5 
The  Complete  System  Taken  together,  the 
price-adjustment  and  expectations-formation  equa- 
tions  summarize  the  operation  of  the  inflationary 
transmission  mechanism.  These  two  equations  ex- 
plain  the  mutual  determination  of actual  and  expected 
rates  of  price  increase.  They  also  indicate  the  iter- 
ative  interaction  process  whereby  the  expected  infla- 
tion  rate  influences  the  actual  current  rate,  which  in 
turn  becomes  a  determinant  of  next  period’s  ex- 
pected  rate,  which  feeds  back  into  next  period’s 
actual  rate,  etc.  Moreover,  the  model  demonstrates 
how  inflationary  expectations  operate  to  lengthen  the 
lagged  adjustment  of  prices  to  short-run  shifts  in 
demand.  This  latter  result  is obtained  by  substituting 
the  expectations-formation  equation  into  the  price- 
5 The  argument  here  is  that,  by  directly  altering  the  ex- 
pectations  coefficient,  controls  could  speed  the  downward 
adjustment  of  price  expectations  necessary  for  the  re- 
moval  of  inflation.  Of  course  controls  might  also  speed 
the  adjustment  process  simply  by  constraining  the  actual 
rate  of  inflation  below  the  level  that  would  otherwise 
occur  at  a  given  level  of  unemployment.  In  the  latter 
case,  controls  would  take  the  expectations  coefficient  as  a 
given  constant. 
adjustment  equation  and  then  solving  recursively  for 
p.  The  resulting  “reduced  form”  expression  is: 
where  the  second  term  on  the  right-hand  side  of  the 
equation  represents  the  delayed  price  impact  of 
excess  demand  attributable  to  the  operation  of  the 
expectations  lag.  Equation  (3)  states  that  once 
price  anticipations  enter  into  price-setting  behavior, 
they  tend  to  prolong  the  inflationary  process.  They 
cause  current  prices  to  respond  not  only  to  last 
period’s  excess  demand  but  also  to  excess  demand  in 
the  more  distant  past. 
Finally,  the  model  identifies  excess  demand  as  the 
proximate  source  of  inflation.  Specifically,  the  model 




Inflation  is determined  by  excess  demand  and 
inflationary  expectations. 
Inflationary  expectations  are  generated  by 
previous  inflationary  experience  and  hence  by 
previous  excess  demand. 
Therefore,  excess  demand-past  and  present 
-is  the  proximate  cause  of  inflation. 
The  inflation-generating  role  of  excess  demand  is 
made  explicit  in  the  reduced-form  equation  (3) 
where past levels of x constitute  the  sole  independent 
variables.  The  model  does  not  explain  how  excess 
demand  itself  is  generated.  Such  an  explanation 
would  require  an  additional  equation  expressing  the 
relation  between  excess  demand  and  the  independent 
variables  that  determine  it.  At  a  very  minimum,  the 
list  of  independent  variables  would  include  the  money 
stock  since  excess  demand  cannot  be  long  sustained 
without  the  monetary  growth  necessary  to  support  it. 
Note,  however,  that  there  is at  least  one  situation  in 
which  excess  demand  would  properly  be  treated  as 
an  independent  variable  and  the  money  stock  as  a 
dependent  variable.  Such  would  be  the  case  if  so- 
ciety  were  committed  to a  full-employment  objective 
in  excess  of  the  natural  or  equilibrium  level  of  em- 
ployment.  Here  the  policymakers  would  be  expected 
to  pursue  the  target  employment  rate  (or  level  of 
excess  demand),  passively  permitting  the  money 
stock  and  the  rate  of  inflation  to  adjust  so  as  not  to 
inhibit  attainment  of  the  full-employment  goal.  In 
this  case  the  level  of  excess  demand  would  enter  the 
system  as a datum  to  determine  the  size  of  the  money 
stock.  Thus,  depending  upon  the  policy  regime, 
excess  demand  may  appear  either  as  an  endogenous 
or  an  exogenous  variable. 
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